The conditions are imprecise, leaving substantial judicial discretion. Article 1911<\/sup> defines the concept circularly: manifest unfoundedness must follow from the claim, attachments, case circumstances and common knowledge. A meaningful non-circular definition is difficult.<\/p>\n Once so classified, a claim may be dismissed in closed session without service on the named defendant or determination of accompanying applications. Obviously pointless steps may be omitted, including requests to cure defects or pay fees, checking dispute value or transferring the case.<\/p>\n The court must give reasons of its own motion. It need not address the merits, despite having considered them marginally because it dismisses on the merits rather than rejects procedurally. It need only explain why the action is manifestly unfounded. Only the claimant receives the reasoned judgment and appeal instructions.<\/p>\n Case law has elaborated. The Katowice Court of Appeal says:<\/p>\n Manifest unfoundedness exists where any lawyer can say in advance, without deeper legal analysis, that the action cannot succeed. It concerns wholly unambiguous cases[2]<\/a>.<\/p>\n A claim is manifestly unfounded where its content shows no prospect of success in any circumstances, making processing a waste of judicial time. Any lawyer can identify this without deeper analysis[3]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n The Szczecin Court of Appeal similarly states:<\/p>\n Any lawyer must find it entirely obvious, without factual or legal analysis, that the claim cannot succeed. This must follow from its contents, possibly with common knowledge and facts officially known to the court. Assessment rests on all circumstances known at that time[4]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n I cannot fully agree. Extensive legal analysis may be unnecessary, perhaps any legal analysis. But saying no factual examination whatsoever is needed is dangerous. That would justify procedural rejection rather than substantive dismissal. The statutory choice of dismissal affects the required examination.<\/p>\n The \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal, citing the bill\u2019s explanatory memorandum, explains more broadly:<\/p>\n A claim with no possible prospect of success wastes judicial resources. Its legal or factual deficiency is apparent without deeper legal analysis or evidence-taking. This includes documents merely labelled claims, good-faith claims based on ignorance of legal position and sham claims pursuing concealed purposes. Particularly relevant are actions seeking neither a favourable ruling nor harassment, but participation in proceedings for its own sake: Sejm paper 3137. Manifest unfoundedness must follow from the claim itself, possibly common and officially known facts.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n The Krak\u00f3w Court of Appeal adds that every doubt negates manifest unfoundedness:<\/p>\n Avoiding resources for claims inevitably requiring dismissal justifies restricting procedural rights. But this exceptional restriction of court access requires every doubt to count against manifest unfoundedness. The concept must be interpreted strictly[5]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n This too warrants criticism. Nearly every claim creates some doubt. If any doubt defeats the mechanism, that undermines its purpose of reducing unnecessary judicial work.<\/p>\n The Gda\u0144sk Court of Appeal interprets \u201ccircumstances concerning the case\u201d as:<\/p>\n Legal circumstances: substantive provisions forming a hypothetical basis for decision on facts in the claim, attachments and Article 228 material[6]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n This sensible definition exposes inconsistency. If substantive legal bases are included, the Szczecin view that no factual or legal examination is needed cannot be correct.<\/p>\n The court also officially knew their appeal against a rent judgment had failed. It dismissed as manifestly unfounded under Articles 1911<\/sup> and 13 \u00a7 2.<\/p>\n Its reasoning was:<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Article 1(65) of the Act of 4 July 2019 (Journal of Laws 2019, item 1469), amending the Code from 7 November 2019.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Katowice Court of Appeal judgment of 1 June 2022, V ACa 237\/22, LEX no. 3436622.<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Katowice Court of Appeal judgment of 21 March 2022, V ACa 58\/22, LEX no. 3435957.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Szczecin Court of Appeal judgment of 12 August 2021, I ACa 445\/20, LEX no. 3240338.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Krak\u00f3w Court of Appeal judgment of 29 May 2020, I ACa 231\/20, LEX no. 3033460.<\/p>\n\n
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SUPREME COURT ORDER OF 18 APRIL 2024, I CSK 695\/23<\/h2>\n
Facts and lower-court decisions<\/h2>\n
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The Supreme Court\u2019s position<\/h2>\n
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